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from the census, transactions values, tax assessments, and rental values.  Additionally, while most
studies use micro-level data, some have used summary statistics such as the median housing value.
Assessing neighborhood price indices in Los Angeles, we find that indices based on transactions prices
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levels than either asset-value measure.  Finally, indices based on median values are poorly correlated
with the other indices, public goods, and income.
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INTERJURISDICTIONAL HOUSING PRICES AND SPATIAL AMENITIES:   
WHICH MEASURES OF HOUSING PRICES REFLECT LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS? 
 
H. Spencer Banzhaf 






Housing is the most important asset and largest expenditure category in most households' budg-
ets.  Accordingly, accurate data on the value of homes is a lynchpin in many economic studies.  
For example, because housing accounts for about 30 percent of households' expenditures, hous-
ing costs play a key role in computing geographic comparisons in the cost-of-living, such as the 
US ACCRA index, as well as intertemporal indices of inflation. 
An accurate representation of home values is also a critical step in many empirical studies 
of local public goods.  Through the process of capitalization, home values are deeply intertwined 
with spatial public goods such as school quality, crime, air quality, hazardous waste sites, and 
green spaces, and the taxes that pay for them.  The differences in housing values associated with 
differences in these public goods and taxes have long been used by economists to infer people's 
demand for such goods.
1  Prominent examples of such "hedonic" methods include applications to 
intercity quality-of-life measures (Albouy 2010, Blomquist, Berger and Hoehn 1988), education 
(Black 1999, Figlio and Lucas 2004), crime (Bishop and Murphy 2011), racial segregation (Baja-
ri and Kahn 2005), air quality (Chay and Greenstone 2005, Grainger 2011, Smith and Huang 
1995), superfund sites (Gamper-Rabindran, Mastromonaco, and Timmins 2011, Greenstone and 
Gallagher 2008), cancer risks (Davis 2004), and property taxes (Palmon and Smith 1998). 
More recently, economists have emphasized the importance of general equilibrium ef-
fects in evaluating households' demand for public goods and the effects of public policies (Ku-
minoff, Smith, and Timmins 2010).  Changing the geographic distribution of local public goods 
will induce households to move, with attending effects on local real estate prices, local peer 
                                                            
1 Early examples include Oates (1969) and Ridker and Henning (1967).  For an overview of the literature, 
see Palmquist (2004). 2 
 
groups, and tax revenues.  For example, Sieg et al. (2004) show that improving air quality in 
some neighborhoods can cause what they call "environmental gentrification," which benefits 
landlords at the expense of poor renters, leading to very different distributional welfare effects in 
general equilibrium (see also Tra 2010).  Calabrese et al. (2006) consider the implications of 
household sorting on endogenous neighborhood demographics for voting on public goods.  
Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007) emphasize the importance of accounting for endogenously 
formed neighborhood demographics and their interactions with school quality and unobserved 
locational goods.  Walsh (2007) illustrates the importance of endogenous development patterns 
when understanding the effect of open space policies.  And Kuminoff (2011) emphasizes the 
importance of the choice of job location as well as residential location when households maxim-
ize utility over public goods, commutes, and housing prices. 
To incorporate these housing feedbacks in an equilibrium model, an emerging strategy in 
the public economics literature is to use a two-stage discrete-continuous model, in which house-
holds first choose a community and then a quantity of continuous housing.  A crucial step in this 
strategy is the estimation of community-level price indices.  From there, one approach then 
leverages insights from hierarchical models, in which the demand for high-quality communities 
makes them more expensive, to estimate community-level quality indices based on these price 
indices.  These quality indices, in turn, can then be decomposed into a function of observed 
public goods (see e.g. Calabrese et al. 2006, Epple and Sieg 1999, Kuminoff 2011, and Sieg et al. 
2004 ).  A second approach applies insights from the industrial organization literature (Berry, 
Levinson, and Pakes 1995) to locational choice, estimating a preference for communities that can 
be decomposed into the utility for public goods and disutility for high housing costs (see e.g. 
Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan 2007, Bayer, Keohane and Timmins 2009, and Tra 2010). 
The most fundamental step in this entire body of research is an accurate estimate of the 
spatial variation in quality-adjusted housing prices.  But economists and other analysts have not 
yet settled on best practices for estimating those indices.  In particular, researchers have used a 
variety of data sources on housing values, including recorded transactions prices, survey data of 
owner-reported housing values (available from the US Census), tax assessments, and rental 
prices.  Transactions prices often are considered the gold standard, well worth the additional 
expense of obtaining them, but there has been little actual evidence to justify this presumption. 3 
 
A related issue is whether to use micro-level data or aggregate summary statistics.  Most 
studies use micro-level housing data from one of the above sources, but others have relied on 
aggregate statistics, such as the median housing value in the county or census tract conditioned 
on community-level housing variables (e.g. Chay and Greenstone 2005, Grainger 2011, Green-
stone and Gallagher 2008).  Again, there has been little evaluation of these judgments.
2 
Each of these approaches has inherent benefits and shortcomings.  In this paper, we eva-
luate them in two ways.  Our first strategy is simple and direct:  we construct community-level 
price indices using a variety of data sources, all of which have been used in the peer-reviewed 
literature, and compare them to one another.  This strategy is one way to gauge how sensitive 
spatial housing price indices are to data sources, but cannot indicate which data are preferable.  
Our second strategy employs an "ascending bundles" criterion suggested by Sieg et al. (2002).  
Using the insights from equilibrium models of locational choice, they note that more expensive 
communities should be those with better public goods and other locational amenities.  Accor-
dingly, those community price indices that best correlate with observed amenities would appear 
to be most sensible.  By this criterion, the "best" index is one that has the best fit when regressed 
on local amenities.
3  By a similar logic, these communities will also be inhabited by the richest 
households.  By this criterion, the "best" index is one that has the tightest correlation with aver-
age income in the community. 
We find that indices based on self-reported values in the US Census are highly correlated 
with indices based on transactions prices, though the latter are somewhat better correlated with 
public goods.  This finding suggests that while households may provide accurate estimates of the 
value of their structures (perhaps because of insurance assessments), they do a poorer job of 
recognizing components of their property values capitalizing local amenities.  Indices based on 
rental prices perform even better when judged by the criterion of correlation with public goods, 
as well as income.  This may be because rents represent current conditions, whereas asset values 
reflect expected future conditions.  Finally, whether based on self-reported asset values or rental 
                                                            
2 See Gamper-Rabindran, Mastromonaco, and Timmins (2011) for one recent discussion of this issue. 
3 Sieg et al. (2002) apply their approach only to functional form and related issues using a single data 
source.  They do not address the question of the type of price information (surveys, transactions, apprais-
als, or rents), which has been a larger question in the literature.  We apply their basic approach to this 
question. 4 
 
values, indices that rely on the community's median price, rather than micro data, are not as 
strongly correlated either with the other indices or with amenities or local incomes.  The median 
price does not appear to aptly represent community-wide conditions. 
Approaches to Estimating Community Housing Price Indices 
Perhaps the most fundamental question when it comes to constructing a community-level hous-
ing price index is whether to use asset values or rental prices.  Often, this choice is determined by 
the research context, and sometimes researchers make use of both types of data (e.g. Calabrese et 
al. 2006, Greenstone and Gallagher 2008).  Rental prices may be most relevant for short-term 
service flows, but only if rental contracts adjust rapidly to changes in public goods and taxes.  If 
rents are sticky, they may be out of equilibrium over long periods.  Observed asset prices may be 
more likely to be in equilibrium at a point in time, but reflect anticipated future service flows.
4 
Even when asset values are desired theoretically, in many cases they must be converted 
to annual user costs (see e.g. Poterba 1992).  Concluding that this conversion is too sensitive to 
assumptions about the opportunity cost of capital and expected capital gains, the US Bureau of 
Labor Statistics has for many years used rental properties as a proxy for the cost of owner-
occupied housing in the Consumer Price Index (see e.g. Gillingham 1983).  The BLS's approach 
has the advantage of side-stepping the imputation of user costs from asset prices.  When survey-
based data must be used, this approach also has the advantage that households presumably are 
much more likely to know their monthly rent with accuracy than the market value of their home.
5  
But it has the disadvantage of relying only on rental properties, which may be very different 
from the owner-occupied housing stock (Glaeser and Gyourko 2007). 
When asset values are to be used, they generally come from one of three sources:  sur-
veys of owners (e.g. the American Community Survey or American Housing Survey), tax as-
sessments, and actual transactions prices.  Each of these sources also has its characteristic advan-
tages and disadvantages.  Survey-based data is readily available from the US Census and has 
been used by Albouy (2010), Bajari and Kahn (2005), Bayer, Keohane, and Timmins (2009), 
                                                            
4 See e.g. the discussion in Greenstone and Gallagher (2008) of these issues and an excellent example of 
the comparative use that can be made of both types of data. 
5 Calabrese et al. (2006) find that though tax assessments correlate well with self-reports of values at the 
community level, the same is not true for rental units.  However, this may be a consequence of biases in 
tax assessments or in the user cost formula they use in their exercise. 5 
 
Greenstone and Gallagher (2008), and many others.  This data source is by far the most conve-
nient, if publically available data are used.  It also has the advantage of being a representative 
sample of all homes. 
However, one disadvantage with publically available census housing data, at least in the 
US, is that they are available as micro data only at large geographies, such as a public-use micro 
area (PUMA), an area with about 100,000 people.  One solution to this problem is to use the 
restricted data, but of course this requires sacrificing the convenience of public data.  An alterna-
tive approach is to forego the micro data and use aggregate, community-level statistics such as 
the median home value in a county or census tract (e.g. Chay and Greenstone 2005, Grainger 
2011, Greenstone and Gallagher 2008).  Most economists would probably agree that, if availa-
ble, the micro-level data is preferable, for two reasons.  First, it makes use of a broader sample of 
houses.  This can be particularly important if only a subset of the distribution of housing quality 
is affected by a policy (see discussion in Gamper-Rabindran, Mastromonaco, and Timmins 
2011).  Second, micro data appropriately matches each house's value to its own characteristics, 
facilitating the conditioning out of observed house-level variables, as with a hedonic regression.  
But the extent of the tradeoff between accessibility and precision is also still an open question. 
Regardless of whether one uses micro or macro data from the Census, there is good rea-
son to question homeowners' ability to assess the value of their home.  In early work, Kain and 
Quigley (1972) found no systematic bias in self reports (though they did find lots of noise).  But 
since that early work, other studies have found that homeowners systematically overstate the 
values of their homes as compared to observed transactions data.  Ilhanfeldt and Martinez-
Vazquez (1986) estimate the overvaluation to be 16 percent; DiPasquale and Somerville (1995) 
find an effect of about 8-10 percent, and Goodman and Ittner (1992) and Kiel and Zabel (1999) 
estimate somewhat more modest overvaluations on the order of 5 percent.  The gap between self-
assessed values and market values may also vary over time, especially during times of large 
movements in market prices (Anenberg 2011, Kuzmenko and Timmins 2011). 
More importantly, for our purposes, Goodman and Ittner (1992), Ihlanfeldt and Martinez-
Vazquez (1986) and Kuzmenko and Timmins (2011) find that these errors in self-reported values 
are correlated with observables typically included in hedonic regressions, suggesting estimated 
coefficients in these regressions would be biased.  Regressing estimated errors in self assess-6 
 
ments on various characteristics, they find the errors are correlated not only with house-level 
variables but also neighborhood variables (Ihlanfeldt and Martinez-Vazquez, Kuzmenko and 
Timmins) or regional dummies (Goodman and Ittner). 
However, Kiel and Zabel (1997, 1999) have cast doubt on these findings.  In particular, 
Kiel and Zabel (1999) find no such relationship between house- or community-level observables 
and divergences between self-reported values and observed transactions.  Kiel and Zabel (1997) 
further constructed inter-temporal housing price indices using both data sources, and found little 
difference in appreciation rates.  Interestingly, however, they do find that recent home buyers are 
the most likely to overestimate the value of their home.
6  Yet the implications of this inter-
temporal result for cross-sectional indices is unclear.  If households poorly appraise time-
invariant effects, cross-section comparisons may be substantially biased, even while inter-
temporal indices are accurate.
7  Needless to say, there appears to be little consensus at this time 
on the accuracy of owner-reported home values. 
Given their innate suspicion of self-assessed values, many economists have preferred to 
use actual transactions data (e.g. Bishop and Murphy 2011, Black 1999, Davis 2004, Figlio and 
Lucas 2004, and Sieg et al. 2004).  This approach is generally considered the gold standard, since 
it uses observed, rather than stated, market prices.  But this data source does have some disad-
vantages.  Perhaps most importantly, such data are difficult to come by and typically must be 
purchased at some expense.  Moreover, it raises sample selection issues, since the sample of 
homes that are sold may not be representative of the housing stock as a whole.  Clapp and Giac-
cotto (1992), Gatzlaff and Haurin (1997, 1998), Ihlanfeldt and Martinez-Vazquez (1986), Jud 
and Seaks (1994), and Kiel and Zabel (1999) all consider the issue of selection bias—again, with 
                                                            
6 See also Follain and Malpezzi (1982) for a similar finding.  Kuzmenko and Timmins (2011) find that 
recent home buyers more correctly predict the values of amenities as well. 
7 For example, suppose in Community 1 in Year 1 the monthly housing costs can be decomposed into a 
$600 housing component (for the structure itself) and a $600 community component (for local public 
goods and amenities).  Suppose in Community 2 it is $400 and $200 respectively.  Suppose further that in 
Year 2 there is pure inflation which increases all these figures by 10%.  Finally, suppose that, in their self-
reports, households know the housing component exactly in each year, but totally ignore the public goods 
component.  Then in both communities the reported ratio of inter-temporal differences of 1.1:1 would be 
exactly right (i.e. 660/600 is the same as 1320/1200 and likewise 440/400 is the same as 1100/1000).  But 
the ratio of reported cross sectional differences (in either year) would be 3:2 while the true value is 2:1.  
In other words, inter-temporal indices based on self-reports would be accurate but cross-sectional indices 
would not be. 7 
 
mixed results. 
Although less common, some studies also make use of assessed values, usually when at-
tention is restricted to land values (e.g. Walsh 2007).  Because homes typically are appraised for 
tax or mortgage purposes, appraisal data has the advantage of being available on a large sample 
of homes, suggesting selection may be less of a concern.  As experts, assessors are also probably 
are more accurate than home-owners in their assessments of real estate values.  However, they 
are not infallible.  At best, they forecast actual values with some measurement error.  At worst, 
they may systematically ignore spatially varying factors, creating biases in cross-sectional com-
parisons.  Similarly, appraisers and appraisal firms may use different rules across jurisdictions.  
Ihlanfeldt and Martinez-Vazquez (1986) find that, for the Atlanta metro area, assessor estimates 
are correct on average, but that they systematically misprice a number of amenities. 
Data 
To assess the importance of these judgments about housing data sources, we construct communi-
ty-level housing price indices using each type of data and then compare them.  In particular, we 
construct cross-sectional housing indices for the Los Angeles metropolitan area (including Los 
Angeles, Orange, and parts of Riverside, San Bernardino, and Ventura counties) in the year 
2000.  We define the "communities" of interest as the PUMAs created by the US Census Bureau.  
Our full data set includes 99 urban PUMAs in the LA area.  Figure 1 shows these PUMAs, with 
the study area shaded.  As seen in the figure, in major cities like LA, the PUMAs are reasonably 
small.  Because some PUMAs are discontiguous, we also consider only the subset of 91 conti-
guous PUMAs in the area. 
Defining the communities as PUMAs allows us to compare the full range of approaches 
from the literature.  First, using publically available data from the 2000 decennial census Inte-
grated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), we have micro-level data on individual owner-
reported housing values and rents, matched to individual housing characteristics.  Naturally, we 
also have aggregate level data (e.g. median price or rent).  Additionally, we have assembled 
transactional data and assessments for the year 2000 in the area, purchased from SiteXdata 
(owned by Fidelity National Data Service), which collects and distributes real estate information.  
These transactions prices are geocoded and can be matched to the PUMAs, allowing a compari-
son to the survey data at the same level of geography. 8 
 
The survey data on home prices from the US Census raises two statistical issues:  it is 
both top coded at $999,999 and categorized by price bins (or brackets).  We addressed this prob-
lem by explicitly modeling the censoring, though we also consider other approaches such as 
simply giving each observation a value equal to the median of each range.  While these issues 
raise additional complications in the comparisons, Kiel and Zabel (1997) find that top coding and 
bracketing have little impact on intertemporal price indices.  Our results confirm their finding:  
We also find little sensitivity to this issue in our cross-sectional indices. 
The data on tax assessments raises another issue.  Since passage of Proposition 13, Cali-
fornia has used an acquisition-value tax system in which tax assessments are tied to the most 
recent sale, with upward adjustments capped at 2 percent per year (see O'Sullivan, Sexton, and 
Sheffrin 1995).  Consequently, assessment-based indices in this application ought to be quite 
close to the transactions-based indices.  Accordingly, the results for the assessment-based index 
are of less interest in this application than they might be in other parts of the country. 
Each data set includes data on housing structures that can be used to hedonically adjust 
each community house index for the size and quality of dwelling units.  The US Census data 
reports the number of bedrooms, number of other rooms, ordinal data on lot size, a dummy 
variable for condominiums, and dummy variables for natural gas connections and various heat-
ing sources.  For rental units, the Census data also includes an indicator for whether meals are 
included and various ordinal variables for the number of units in the building.  The transactions 
and tax assessment data from SiteX is limited to single-family units, consistent with most studies 
using such data.  It includes the number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, cardinal data on lot 
size, dwelling unit size, and a dummy variable for a swimming pool.  These data are summarized 
in Table 1. 
A final issue raised by these data is the fact that these house-level controls are not per-
fectly overlapping across data sets.  One perspective on this issue is that, inevitably, when choos-
ing data sources researchers are in fact committing themselves to using certain control variables, 
and these differences are an inherent part of the choice.  From this point of view, these differenc-
es in the data are as relevant as any other and should be factored into any comparison.  Another 
perspective is that differences in available hedonic control variables may cloud inference about 
the dependability of the price data itself.  From this point of view, these differences should be 9 
 
factored out.  As discussed below, we consider both perspectives, hedonically adjusting the price 
indices for either all available controls or alternatively only for those that are common to all 
datasets.  We find little sensitivity of the results to this choice. 
Finally, in addition to the house-level data, we gathered community level data on public 
goods and other amenities.  These include school quality, commute times, air quality, and prox-
imity to the coast.  For school quality, we use the 9
th grade Standardized Testing and Reporting 
(STAR) test, summing the math and reading scores.
8,9  For commute times, we used the average 
time reported in the US Census, by PUMA.  For air quality, we gathered ozone data from the US 
EPA at monitors in the five-county LA area and all bordering counties.  At each monitor, we 
collected the average annual number of exceedences of the 1-hour ozone standard from 1998-
2000.  We then imputed these values to each census tract, using an inverse-distance weighted 
average of the two nearest monitors, and then aggregated tracts up to PUMAS using housing 
units as weights.  And for the coastal variable, we simply assigned a coastal indicator variable 
equal to one if a PUMA borders the Pacific Ocean.  Table 2 provides summary statistics of these 
variables. 
Methods and Results 
For the microdata-based indices, we model housing prices as a log-linear function of house-
specific structural parameters x and community fixed effects α.  That is, for house h in communi-
ty c using data source and data treatment d, prices are modeled as 
lnPhcd  =  αcd +   
′ xhcd + εhcd. 
For each of our base or "preferred" models, the vector x includes all the available regressors 
listed in Table 1 for each data source d, with age entered flexibly through a set of nine dummy 
variables.  Following the standard approach in the literature, we then compute the price index for 
Community c from the community fixed effect, as exp(αcd), and renormalize the indices on (0,1) 
                                                            
8 Additionally, we considered math and reading scores as separate variables, but could not reject the 
hypothesis that the coefficient on each was identical.  Accordingly, we simply summed the two scores. 
9 Because geo-coded boundary maps were not available at the school level, we impute test scores to each 
census block group by assigning it to the nearest high school within its school district.  We then aggre-
gated up to the PUMA. 10 
 
for each data source/treatment d.
10 
For the median-based indices, we have only one observation per community.  In this 
case, we estimate the following model: 
ln(median Pcd)  =  αd +   
     cd + εcd, 
where    cd is the mean value of the structural variables in community c for data source d.  Note 
   cd may include the mean values of dummy variables, e.g., for age categories, giving the propor-
tion of the housing stock falling in each category; in this way, other summary statistics besides 
the mean may be captured.  Then the price index is computed from the community-level residual 
as exp(αd + εcd). 
Are Cross Sectional Price Indices Sensitive to Data Sources? 
Our first set of results addresses the question of the sensitivity of community housing price 
indices to the data used.  To address this question, we simply compute the correlation matrix of 
all the price indices we have considered.  These results are shown in Table 3.  The table is di-
vided into six sections, each corresponding to one of the six main data sources:  transactions 
prices, micro-based indices of self-reported asset prices, median-based indices of self-reported 
asset prices, tax assessments, micro-based indices of rental prices, and median-based indices of 
rental prices.  The first row/column in each section corresponds to our preferred approach for 
using each data source.  In these preferred models, we control for all available hedonic variables 
and, for the self-reported asset prices, we account for the binning and top-coding of the data 
using a generalized Tobit regression.  The other rows/columns in each section correspond to 
alternative treatments of the data, discussed in detail below. 
Comparing for now only the preferred models in the first rows/columns of each section to 
one another, we first note that indices based on self-reported values from the US Census are 
quite close to transactions data, a result consistent with Kiel and Zabel's (1997) comparison of 
inter-temporal price indices.  The correlations between the indices using transactions prices and 
self-reported values is 0.96.  The relationship is depicted in Panel A of Figure 2.  These results 
would appear to justify the use of more easily obtainable Census data as a proxy for expensive 
                                                            
10 An alternative approach would predict the price of a house with specific characteristics in each com-
munity, allowing β to vary and omitting the fixed effect (see e.g. Malpezzi, Chun, and Green 1998, Sieg 
et al. 2002). 11 
 
transactions data—as long as micro-level data is available with which to hedonically adjust for 
house size.  However, as we will see below, the transactions data are more tightly correlated with 
public goods. 
Moreover, this picture changes when we consider the median self-assessed price in the 
community.  The correlation between the median-price self-report index and the transaction-
based index is only 0.54.  Significantly, even the correlation between the median-based self-
reported index and the micro-based self-reported index is only 0.60 (Panel B of Figure 2), sug-
gesting that relying on the median price substantially changes the pattern of cross-sectional 
prices regardless of the actual source of those prices. 
Second, in this application to Los Angeles, indices based on transactions data are very 
close to those based on tax assessments.  The correlation between the indices using these two 
data sources is above 0.99.  This tight correlation is depicted in Panel C of Figure 2.  As noted 
previously, this is not surprising in our application to California, where tax assessments are 
formally based on past transactions prices. 
Next, we find that indices based on rental prices deviate somewhat from those using asset 
values.  The correlation of rental prices with transactions prices is 0.86 (depicted in Panel D of 
Figure 2), while the correlation with self-reported asset values is only about 0.80 (Panel E).  
Again, though, the pattern is very different for the median-based index using rental prices.  Its 
correlation with the micro-based rental index, depicted in Panel F of Figure 2, is only 0.46.  In 
fact, its correlation with the median-based asset-price index is almost as high (0.44), suggesting 
the use of the median per se drives the variation as much as the type of price. 
Turning now to the variants of these indices within each group, we find the results are not 
at all sensitive to the treatment of the data.  In particular, for any of the data sources, confining 
the hedonic price model to a parsimonious set of regressors common to both the census and 
transactions data sources makes little difference.
11  The correlations with these parsimonious 
indices and our preferred indices are all 0.99.  Similarly, the correlations across data sources 
change only slightly when we confine the comparison to a common set of regressors.  For exam-
                                                            
11 The "parsimonious" models restrict the hedonic model to only bedrooms, other rooms (census) or 
bathrooms (SiteX), the measures of lot size, and age.  Of course, the implication of omitted variables for 
predicting prices is ambiguous and different than their implication for obtaining unbiased estimates of 
regression parameters (see Malpezzi, Chun, and Green 1998 for discussion in the housing context).   12 
 
ple, the correlation between the transactions-price index and the self-assessment index remains 
about 0.96, whereas the correlation between the transaction-price index and rent index falls 
slightly from 0.86 to 0.82.  Additionally, for the self-reported data, ignoring the binning and top-
coding of the census data makes little difference.
12  Correlations involving these types of com-
parisons also are all over 0.99.  We also considered restricting the analysis to the 91 contiguous 
PUMAs.  Again, that restriction made little difference, with each of the correlations virtually 
unchanged. 
In summary, it appears that the asset-based price indices using micro data all have very 
similar cross-sectional patterns, regardless of the data source (transactions, census self reports, 
tax assessments).  Rent-based price indices give a somewhat different pattern.  And the greatest 
outliers are the median-based indices, whether based on asset prices or rents.  However, simply 
noting such similarities and differences in the correlations cannot speak to which approach does 
a better job of reflecting patterns in spatial amenities and demographics.  We consider this ques-
tion in the following section. 
Relationship with Spatial Amenities 
Economic intuition suggests that spatial amenities should be capitalized into property values.  As 
Sieg et al. (2002) argue, this intuition suggests a criterion for evaluating spatially delineated price 
indices:  better price indices should be more closely correlated with public goods and incomes.  
Sieg et al. apply this logic to the computational formulae for computing indices (simple hedon-
ics, imputation methods, etc.).  In this section, we apply their logic to the various data sources 
that researchers have traditionally used. 
Table 4 shows the relationship between each of the indices we have considered and a set 
of important spatial amenities.  The amenities include the average ninth grade test score on the 
California Star test, the average commute time to work, the number of days exceeding the na-
tional 1-hour ozone standard, and a dummy variable for whether the community borders the 
coast.  Columns 1-3 of the table shows simple correlations between each index and each of these 
variables, omitting the coastal dummy.  (Because of their close connection to transactions-based 
price indices, we now omit the indices based on tax assessments.)  The table shows that all the 
                                                            
12 In this variant, we simply run OLS after assigning a price equal to the midpoint of the bin and, for the 
top-coded observations, a price of $999,999. 13 
 
indices have strong pairwise correlations with at least some of the amenities, although the 
strength of the correlations is notably lower for the median-based indices.  However, because the 
various indices are more or less correlated with different amenities, it is difficult to make any 
conclusions about the relative performance of the indices without first deciding which amenities 
are of more interest. 
Accordingly, we next regress each price index on the entire bundle of four amenities.  
The next four columns of Table 4 show the coefficients from this regression (the constant term is 
not shown).  The fifth column shows the R
2 from this regression.  As a measure of fit, the R
2 of 
the regression represents a gauge of the correlation between the price indices and the spatial 
amenities, taken as a bundle.  As an alternative indicator of fit, the last three columns of the table 
show the number of normalized rank violations between the price index and the index of public 
goods as computed from the respective regression (the proportion of possible pairwise compari-
sons that are off in rank by 1, 5, or 10 places).  When the data are sorted by their price rank, the 
rank violations are computed as follows: 
                               
2
     1 
  1                                               
   
   
 
   
 
for k   {0, 4, 9}. 
Comparing the R
2s, we again find that, within data sources, there is little difference 
across methods of computing the indices.  However, there are substantial differences across data 
sources.  Consider first the indices based on market transactions relative to those based on self-
reported values.  As shown in Table 3 we found those two sets of indices were highly correlated 
(with a correlation of 0.96).  From this, one might conclude that it makes little difference which 
data source is used.  However, we get a very different impression when we compare the relation-
ship between each with the set of spatial amenities.  Here, we find that the indices based on 
market transactions perform better.  When regressed on public goods, the hedonic index based on 
market transactions has an R
2 of 0.53, compared to 0.42 for the hedonic index based on self-
reported values. 
Apparently, though the two indices are tightly correlated, and thus based on some com-
mon factors, a substantial portion of the remaining residual can be accounted for by public 
goods.  To confirm this intuition, we first "partial out" that portion of the transactions-price index 14 
 
that can be explained by the self-reported index.  We then regress the remaining residual on the 
index of spatial amenities.  The latter regression has an R
2 of 0.18, and a joint test of the signific-
ance of the amenities has a p-value of <0.01.  In other words, it appears that households do not 
fully account for cross-sectional variation in public goods and spatial amenities when estimating 
the value of their own home. 
The indices based on rental prices perform even better than the market transactions indic-
es, based on the criterion of fit with spatial amenities.  The R
2 of these regressions are in the 
neighborhood of 0.68, substantially better than the values of 0.53 and 0.42 for the transactions-
based and self-report-based indices respectively.  As discussed previously, in a world of no 
transactions costs, rents theoretically would be expected to better reflect current levels of ameni-
ties, in contrast to asset values which reflect the expected future stream of amenities, which in 
turn are unobserved by the analyst.  However, this might not be true if rents do not fully adjust to 
current conditions because of transactions costs, whereas observed asset prices of property 
(which are conditional on the property selling) do reflect current conditions.  Our results suggest 
that the former effect dominates, so rents better reflect current conditions than asset prices.  
Because current conditions are in principle observed by the analyst but the future conditions 
expected by market participants is not observed, this is a strong argument for using rents rather 
than asset values in Tiebout-like applications in the public economics literature. 
A final result of interest is that neither the median-based index of self-reported asset val-
ues nor the median-based index of rental prices performs very well by this criterion.  The R
2 of 
the regressions of these indices on spatial amenities is only 0.10 and 0.15 respectively, and, with 
the exception of air quality, the individual coefficients on amenities are statistically insignificant.  
These median-based price indices also have more rank violations with the amenities index than 
the other price indices.  It appears that relying on the median price, rather than making use of 
micro data, entails a substantial loss of information.
13 
                                                            
13 Gamper-Rabindran, Mastromonaco, and Timmins (2011) make a related argument that only a portion 
of the housing-price distribution may be affected by an amenity, especially if that amenity is located at a 
discrete point in space.  They consider the example of superfund sites, which tend to be located in neigh-
borhoods with the lowest housing costs.  In such cases, the "median home" may not reflect the 
(dis)amenity, whereas prices in the lower part of the distribution might.  However, all neighborhoods 
likely would benefit from a marginal improvement in their public schools, commute time, and air pollu-
tion, the amenities which we consider. 15 
 
Relationship with Income 
Just as economic intuition suggests that prices should be correlated with local amenities, 
it also suggests that it is the richer households who will pay these higher prices to enjoy the 
amenities.  In models of vertically differentiated communities, this relationship is known as the 
"ascending bundles" property (e.g. Epple and Sieg 1999).  This property provides an additional 
criterion:  just as a good price index of community real estate prices (consistent with economic 
theory) should be correlated with an index of local amenities, so too should it be correlated with 
average income in the community.  We consider this criterion next, using both simple correla-
tions and the normalized rank violations.  The results are displayed in Table 5 and Figure 3.  The 
results are similar to those using the criterion of local amenities.  The transactions-based indices 
and the self-report-based indices perform reasonably well and similar to each other, each having 
a correlation with incomes of about 0.68 (Panels A and B of Figure 3).  The rent-based indices 
again perform somewhat better, with a correlation with income of about 0.83 (Panel D).  Finally, 
both median-based indices again perform much worse, with correlations with income of only 
0.28 and 0.29 (Panels C and E). 
Conclusions 
The capitalization of local amenities into real estate values plays a crucial role in many applica-
tions in public, urban, and environmental economics.  It goes almost without saying that an 
accurate measure of real estate values is a crucial component of such empirical applications.  We 
compared a variety of measures used in the literature by constructing spatial price indices for 
99 communities in the Los Angeles area.  We considered the correlation among different price 
indices, as well as the extent to which they reflect differences in spatial amenities and household 
income across communities. 
We find that indices based on self-reported values in the US Census are highly correlated 
with indices based on transactions prices.  Indices based on median values, rather than micro 
data, appear as outliers in the comparisons.  When considering the extent to which the indices 
capture spatial differences in contemporaneous amenities and income, indices based on rents 
appear to perform the best, with transactions prices and self-reports coming in second and third.  
Indices based on median values or rents perform the worst by these criteria.   16 
 
These results suggest that, despite their potential to be sticky over time, rents represent 
current conditions better than asset values, which reflect expected future conditions.  Among 
asset-based approaches, actual transactions prices appear to better capture local amenities than 
do self-reports, perhaps because households do not consider these factors.  Nevertheless, the two 
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# Observations  109,140  83,635  339,469  237,306 
Observed Sale Price  $292,448  --  --  -- 
Assessed Value  --  $324,281  --  -- 
Self-Reported Value  --  --  $273,625  -- 
Monthly  Rent -- -- --  $774 
Bedrooms 3.208  3.204  3.119  1.920 
Other rooms  --  --  2.877  1.979 
Bathrooms 2.091  2.097  --  -- 
House size  
(square feet)  1732 1732  --  -- 
Lot more than 9 acres 
(0/1)  -- -- 0.042  0.021 
Lot size (acres)  0.2043  0. 2039  --  -- 
Age 39.16  39.67  34.94  33.65 
Condo (0/1)  --  --  0.045  -- 
Natural gas (0/1)  --  --  0.887  0.741 
Electric heat (0/1)  --  --  0.097  0.236 
Solar heat (0/1)  --  --  0.001  0.004 
BTLP gas (0/1)  --  --  0.010  0.016 
Wood heat (0/1)  --  --  0.003  0.002 
Swimming pool (0/1)  0.1807  0.1827  --  -- 
Meal included (0/1)  --  --  --  0.008 
2 unit structure (0/1)  0  0  0  0.044 
3-4 unit structure 
(0/1)  0 0  0  0.127 
5-9 unit structure 
(0/1)  0 0  0  0.126 
10-19 unit structure 
(0/1)  0 0  0  0.110 
20-49 unit structure 
(0/1)  0 0  0  0.100 
50+ unit structure 
(0/1)  0 0  0  0.113 
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Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Test Score  1386  26.13 1333  1446 
Commute Time  28.83  3.082 17.8  36.4 
Ozone exceedences  3.836  4.879 0  23.05 
Coastal (0/1)  0.1111  -- 0  1 
Statistics based on 99 observations (one per community). 
 23 
 


































































































































































































































































































Transactions Price  1            
Transactions Price 
– Parsimonious  0.996  1            
Self‐Reported 








0.963 0.971 0.999  0.998  1         
Self‐Reported 
Value – Median  0.543 0.542 0.598 0.610 0.598  1        
Assessment Value  0.998 0.993 0.955 0.950 0.963 0.545  1      
Assessment Value 
– Parsimonious  0.993 0.998 0.966 0.962 0.971 0.545 0.995  1      
Rental Price  0.861 0.842 0.800 0.791 0.809 0.371 0.849 0.829  1     
Rental Price – 
Parsimonious  0.84  0.818 0.776 0.767 0.786 0.360 0.826 0.803 0.997  1   
Rental Price – 
Median  0.402 0.372 0.346 0.344 0.352 0.439 0.410 0.377 0.455  0.472  1 
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Table 4.  Relationships between Community Price Indices and Spatial Amenities 
 
Simple Correlations  Regression Coefficients 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)    Normalized Rank Violations 




Time  Ozone Test  Score Commute 
Time  Ozone  Coastal 
Community R
2  1 Place  5 Places  10 
Places 
Transactions Price  0.508 -0.384 -0.466
0.321*** -1.019** -1.597*** 12.034*  0.528  0.13 0.10 0.07  (0.051) (0.453) (0.195) (6.488) 
Transactions Price – 
Parsimonious  0.496 -0.358 -0.442
0.332*** -0.918* -1.596*** 11.113  0.483  0.14 0.11 0.07  (0.054) (0.466) (0.199) (6.748) 
Self-Reported Value  0.447 -0.317 -0.443
0.254*** -0.552 -1.379*** 6.388  0.420  0.14 0.10 0.08  (0.043) (0.369) (0.175) (4.953) 
Self-Reported Value – 
Parsimonious  0.440 -0.306 -0.439
0.251*** -0.501 -1.368*** 6.296 
0.409  0.14 0.10 0.08 
(0.044) (0.366) (0.174) (4.929) 
Self-Reported Value – 
Ignoring Censoring  0.462 -0.324 -0.453
0.281*** -0.598 -1.504*** 6.929 
0.442  0.14 0.10 0.08 
(0.047) (0.398) (0.185) (5.294) 
Self-Reported Value – 
Median  0.110 -0.035 -0.263
0.048 0.385  -0.809***  7.071  0.103  0.30 0.26 0.22  (0.055) (0.434) (0.223) (5.529) 
Rental Price  0.686 -0.381 -0.439
0.535*** -0.772* -1.782***  4.278  0.682  0.12 0.09 0.06  (0.047) (0.448) (0.228) (4.812) 
Rental Price –  
Parsimonious  0.703 -0.375 -0.428
0.544*** -0.706 -1.725*** 4.357  0.696  0.12 0.09 0.06  (0.047) (0.438) (0.232) (4.664) 
Rental Price – Median  0.142 -0.224 -0.344
0.067 -0.641  -1.119***  3.940 0.153  0.26 0.22 0.18  (0.068) (0.683) (0.370) (7.180) 
All models based on 99 observations (one observation per community). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level; **5% level; *10% level. 25 
 





Normalized Rank Violations 
1 Place  5 Places  10 Places 
Transactions Price  0.68  0.19  0.15  0.10 
Transactions Price –  
Parsimonious  0.67 0.19  0.15 0.11 
Self-Reported Value  0.68  0.19  0.15  0.11 
Self-Reported Value –  
Ignoring censoring  0.67 0.19  0.15 0.11 
Self-Reported Value –  
Parsimonious  0.68 0.19  0.15 0.11 
Self-Reported Value – Median  0.28  0.29  0.25  0.20 
Rental Price  0.83  0.13  0.10  0.06 
Rental Price – Parsimonious  0.85  0.13  0.09  0.06 
Rental Price – Median  0.29  0.28  0.25  0.21 
All models based on 99 observations (one observation per community). 
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Figure 2.  Comparison of Community Price Indices across Data Sources 
Panel A.  Indices using self-reported values vs. 
transactions prices
 
Panel B.  Median-based vs. micro-based indices 
using self-reported values
 
Panel C.  Indices using tax assessments vs. trans-
actions prices
 
Panel D.  Indices using rental prices vs. transaction 
prices
 
Panel E.  Indices using rental prices vs. self-
reported values
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Figure 3.  Comparison of Community Price Indices with Average Income 
Panel A.  Transactions Prices
 
Panel B.  Self-Reported Values
 
Panel C.  Median-based Self-Reported Values 
 
Panel D.  Rental Prices 
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